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Is it acceptable
for people
to take
methylphenidate
to enhance
performance?
A drug that can improve your
exam results may sound
tempting, and John Harris
believes that we should
embrace its possibilities.
Anjan Chatterjee, however,
argues that the dangers have
been underplayed

John Harris Lord Alliance professor of bioethics and director,
Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, University of
Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL
john.harris@manchester.ac.uk

Many healthy students
are thought to use
methylphenidate (Ritalin)
and other chemical cognitive enhancers
to improve academic performance.1 The
arguments against their being permitted
so to do have not been persuasive.2 The
crucial ethical question is whether this is a
matter for regret or celebration.
Ethical dimension
Suppose a university were to set out
deliberately to improve the mental
capacities of its students; suppose its stated
aims were to ensure that students left the
university more intelligent and learned
than when they arrived. Suppose they
further claimed that not only could they
achieve this but that their students would
be more intelligent and mentally alert
than any students in history. What should
our reaction be?
We might be sceptical, but if the
claims could be sustained, should we
be pleased? Would we welcome such a
breakthrough and want our children to
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Why would anyone object to
someone choosing to be smarter,
better focused, and more productive? Surely cognitive enhancement has
much to offer individuals and society, and
legal dispensers of methylphenidate (Ritalin)
should not object. Unfortunately, the case
for healthy people taking this drug is not so
straightforward. Doctors routinely decide
whether to intervene based on a calculation
of relative risks and benefits. Here, the risks
outweigh the benefits.
Some doctors might reflexively think
that the answer to the target question is
an obvious “no.” After all, doctors are in
the business of treating disease and not
enhancing normal abilities. On scrutiny,
this distinction proves to be unreliable,
particularly when conditions lack clear
categorical boundaries. For example, if
individuals of short stature can be “treated”
with growth hormone, 1 does it matter if
they are short because of a growth hormone deficiency or because of other rea-

go to such a university? We ought to want
this. It is, after all, part of what education
is supposed to be for. And if the gains
in cognitive functioning were significant
and the costs commensurate we would
probably want them for our children and
want to see them more widely adopted in
education.
Now suppose, as indeed has already
happened, several drugs had been shown
to improve cognitive performance and
had been proved to be safe for use in
children. What should our reaction be?
Would it be unethical to use these drugs in
healthy people to enhance performance?
Would it be ethical not to do so?2
Risks and benefits
Methylphenidate and several other so
called chemical cognitive enhancers have
been shown to significantly improve
cognitive functioning and have proved
safe in clinical contexts.3 Safe always
means safe enough, and since no drugs
are free of side effects, that always means
that the consumer has judged the risks of
adverse effects worth taking, given the
probable benefits. Methylphenidate has
been judged safe enough to be widely
used in children and young people with

sons?2 Furthermore, the widespread use
of cosmetic surgery to enhance normal
physical attributes shows that many doctors, given the right incentives and cultural
framework,3 become comfortable with nontherapeutic interventions.4
Questionable benefit
The most obvious reason to object to using
methylphenidate for healthy enhancements is that the cognitive benefits are
minimal 5 and the medical risks are not.
In the United States, the Food and Drug
Administration gave methylphenidate a
“black box,” the most alarming of possible warnings, because of its high potential
for abuse and dependence and its risks of
sudden death and serious cardiovascular
adverse events.6 Furthermore, the incidence
of serious cardiac arrhythmias is likely to
be higher in older people with incipient
cardiovascular disease, one group that is
likely to use the drugs to enhance performance. Non-physicians calling for responsible
use of methylphenidate by healthy people7
underappreciate this risk.8
Besides medical side effects, there are also
possible cognitive trade-offs. For example,
BMJ | 27 June 2009 | Volume 338
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The drug’s significant advantages
include enhanced executive
functioning, enhanced study skills,
and improvement in the focusing
of attention and in the manipulation
of information2
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) over a long period. Since the
disorder is not usually life threatening and
the beneficial therapeutic effects largely
depend on the same properties that make
the drug an enhancing intervention, those
same benefits will also justify its use from
the safety perspective in healthy adults,
who (presumably) value those effects as
much as do those with ADHD. Moreover,
methylphenidate has proved safe enough
to be ethical to use in research with
healthy subjects to test cognitive effects,
where the use is clearly elective rather
than therapeutic.
The drug’s significant advantages
include enhanced executive functioning,
enhanced study skills, and improvement
in the focusing of attention and in
the manipulation of information.2 As
Farah and colleagues have noted: “Our
regulatory agencies determine what
greater focus from long term use of methylphenidate could plausibly produce a loss in
creativity, which generally requires a loosening of mental boundaries.9 Such trade-offs
are rarely considered or investigated.
In considering benefits, we might postulate that being smart is good for the world.
Many smart people would like to believe that
products of smartness confer clear benefits to
society. Perhaps the brightest getting brighter
would produce trickle down enhancements
into our communities. But the fact that very
smart people generating complicated models to distribute financial risk contributed to
the current global economic crisis should at
least give us pause. Being smarter does not
mean being wiser. Furthermore, this dubious
benefit is counterbalanced by two other risks.
These are risks of expanding social inequities
and inviting coercion.10
Equity and choice
Drug enhancements will be available disproportionately to those with financial means. If
enhancements are helpful in getting ahead in
a competitive world, then the haves would
avail themselves of yet another advantage
over the have nots. Clearly, many inequities

constitutes a sufficiently careful search
for side effects and what side effects are
acceptable in view of a drug’s benefits
. . . we see no reason why the same
approach cannot be applied [in the case
of neurocognitive enhancement]”.4 This
would be one reasonable approach to
safety. However, here I am interested in
the question of whether there are any
principled ethical objections to the use of
chemical cognitive enhancers in healthy
individuals, not with the definition of
safety.
Human nature
Clear thinking on the issue of human
enhancement has been bedevilled by the
issue of doping in sport. Sport, however,
is not a matter of life and death, even
though some might agree with the football
manager Bill Shankly that it is “far
more important than that.” The wrong
of performance enhancers in sport, if
there is one, is that such substances are
almost universally banned by the rules
of competition; using them is therefore
cheating. But absent the ban, absent the
cheating.
It is not rational to be against human
enhancement; humans are creatures that

in education, material goods, and social
class, not to mention more fundamental
inequities in health care, nutrition, shelter,
and safety, already give the socioeconomically lucky disproportionate advantages.
However, acknowledging the existence of
disturbing inequities does not justify blithely
adding more.
Matters of choice can evolve into forces of
coercion. Implicit pressures to better one’s
position in some perceived social order
would find a natural conduit in cognitive
enhancements. Such pressures increase in
“winner take all” environments, in which
more people compete for fewer and bigger prizes.11 Professionals in the US work
60, 80, or more than 100 hours a week to
the detriment of health and hearth. Children at high end preparatory schools take
methylphenidate and its analogues in epidemic proportions.12 This trend is growing among students 13 and even among
p rofessors. 14 To not take advantage of

In the United States, the Food
and Drug Administration gave
methylphenidate a “black box,” the
most alarming of possible warnings
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result from an enhancement process
called evolution (mixed as its benefits
are) and moreover are inveterate self
improvers in every conceivable way.
Synthetic sunshine (firelight,
lamplight, and electric light) is just
one accepted example of a valuable
enhancement technology which,
like such others as written language,
education, physical exercise, and diet,
creates problems of justice as well as
the side effects of use and overuse.
And beneficial neural changes have
been reported for reading,5 education,6
physical exercise,7 and diet.8 How then
are drugs ethically distinct? Before
synthetic sunshine people slept when it
was dark and worked in the light of day.
With the advent of synthetic sunshine
work and social life could continue
into and through the night, creating
competitive pressures and incentives
for those able or willing to use it to their
advantage. The solution, however, was
not to outlaw synthetic sunshine but to
regulate working hours and improve
access. The same is, or will be, true of
chemical cognitive enhancers.
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enhancements might mean being left
behind. Coercion can also become explicit,
as might occur in the military,15 if superior
performance by a few is deemed necessary for the greater good. Pilots and police
might face similar pressures. Closer to BMJ
readers, residents might be forced to take
enhancements after being on call to mitigate
cognitive deficits brought on by sleep deprivation. Perhaps doctors older than 50 would
be required to pharmacologically stave off
their fraying cognitive edges.
Endorsing the legal non-therapeutic use of
methylphenidate or other cognitive enhancers now is premature. The efficacy and risk
of enhancers in healthy people needs to be
researched adequately. This information
needs to be disseminated broadly. Doctors,
educators, and regulators need to articulate
professional normative positions on the issue.
Enforceable policies to minimise disparities
and protect individuals need to be established. Until such preparations are made, it
is not acceptable to recommend that healthy
people take drugs to enhance performance.
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